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Abstract
When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal,
which provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a
Pareto improving policy, even when the welfare eects of rationing are taken into account.
An appealing aspect of price regulation is that it operates anonymously on market variables.
The welfare analysis of price regulation calls for an extension of the equilibrium theory of
incomplete markets to x-price equilibria.
Fix-price equilibria exist under standard assumptions. There are robust examples,
however, for which at regulated prices close to competitive prices, there are no x-price
equilibria close to competitive equilibria. We provide necessary and sucient conditions
for the local uniqueness of x-price equilibria, and show that under these conditions Pareto
improving price regulation is generically possible.
Key words: incomplete asset market, x-price equilibria, Pareto improvement.
JEL classication numbers: D45, D52, D60.
1 Introduction
One of the major accomplishments of economic theory is a rigorous proof of the Pareto
optimality of competitive equilibrium allocations. A crucial assumption to get such a re-
sult is that asset markets are complete. When the asset market is incomplete, competitive
equilibrium allocations generically fail to satisfy the criterion of Pareto optimality. Com-
pleting the asset markets does not necessarily lead to Pareto improvements. Financial
innovation may lead to a Pareto deterioration as is shown by the example of Hart (1975).
Conditions for Pareto improving nancial innovation to be possible are rather restrictive,
see Elul (1995), Hara (1997), and Cass and Citanna (1998).
When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibrium allocations are gener-
ically not even constrained suboptimal, a criterion of optimality that recognizes the in-
completeness of the asset market. As has been shown in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986), there exist reallocations of asset portfolios that yield Pareto improvements in wel-
fare after prices in spot commodity markets adjust to attain equilibrium.
The failure of constrained optimality casts doubt on the desirability of non-intervention
with competitive markets, such as the laissez faire policy in international trade. Never-
theless, the empirical content of portfolio reallocation is rather meager. Apart from infor-
mational requirements, the heterogeneity of individuals and the requirement of anonymity
may interfere with improving interventions, see also Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998)
and Kajii (1994).
In this paper we investigate an alternative to the reallocation of asset portfolios, the
direct regulation of prices in spot commodity markets. An intervention in spot market
prices is not an intervention in individual choice variables but in market variables. As
such it satises the requirement of anonymity. Interventions in the price mechanism are
frequently observed. Nguyen and Whalley (1986) make the same observation, stating
\Price controls have been employed by governments all over the world, during war and
peace, in response to all manners of threats (both real and imaginary), and in all ages."
Price regulation seems odd when viewed from a traditional eciency perspective. We
show that Pareto improving price regulation is possible when asset markets are incomplete.
Moreover, the deviation of prices from their competitive equilibrium values can be chosen
independently of the state of the world
1
. This makes price regulation comparable to the
reallocation of portfolios carried out before the resolution of uncertainty.
Direct antecedants of our result are the argument in Polemarchakis (1979), which
showed that xed wages that need not match shocks in productivity may yield higher
expected utility in spite of the loss of output in an economy of overlapping generations;
and the argument in Dreze and Gollier (1993), which employed the capital asset pricing
model to determine optimal schedules of wages that dier from the marginal productiv-
ity of labor. An example of Pareto improving price regulation was developed in Kalmus
(1997).
1
John Geanakoplos insisted on this point.
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To address the issue of Pareto improving price regulation, we need an equilibrium
notion that allows for trading at non-competitive prices, while maintaining the scenario
of frictionless markets which characterizes competitive equilibria with incomplete markets.
The equilibrium notion used is an extension of the x-price equilibrium of Dreze (1975) to
the incomplete markets set-up. Such equilibria are shown to exist in Section 3.
In Section 4, we study the local behavior of x-price equilibria in the neighborhood of
competitive ones. Despite the equilibrium existence, the behavior of x-price equilibria in
the neighborhood of competitive equilibria is particularly complicated. There are robust
examples for which at regulated prices close to competitive prices, there are no x-price
equilibria close to competitive equilibria. We provide necessary and sucient conditions for
local uniqueness of x-price equilibria. The properties of the equilibrium manifold imply
that these conditions are weaker than the requirement of uniqueness of x-price equilibria
for prices in the neighborhood of competitive equilibria. The welfare implications of price
regulation in the neighborhood of competitive equilibria are derived.
Section 5 shows that Pareto improving price regulation is possible when the require-
ment of local uniqueness is satised. The conditions under which this result holds, that
the number of instruments (commodities) exceeds the number of objectives (individuals),
implies that the result complements the one of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
Section 6 illustrates the results by means of an example.
2 The Economy
The economy is the standard two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete asset
markets and numeraire assets. Transactions occur in assets before and in commodities after
the state of nature is known. An economy E = ((X
i
; u
i
; e
i
)
i2I
; R) consists of consumption
sets X
i
; utility functions u
i
and endowments e
i
for all individuals i 2 I; and an asset return
matrix R:
States of the world are s 2 S = f1; : : : ; Sg and commodities are l 2 L = f1; : : : ; L+1g:
At state s; commodity (L + 1; s) is assumed to be a numeraire commodity. Assets are
a 2 A = f1; : : : ; A + 1g: Asset A + 1 is assumed to be a numeraire asset. The payos of
assets are denominated in the numeraire commodity, (L+1; s); in every state of the world.
The economy satises the following assumptions.
A1. For every individual i; the consumption set is X
i
= IR
(L+1)S
++
:
A2. For every individual i; the utility function is twice continuously dierentiable, @u
i

0; @
2
u
i
is negative denite on (@u
i
)
?
; and satises the boundary condition, for every
x
i
2 X
i
; the closure of the set fx
i
2 X
i
j u
i
(x
i
)  u
i
(x
i
)g is contained in IR
(L+1)S
++
:
A3. For every individual i; the endowment is strictly positive, e
i
2 X
i
:
A4. The asset return matrix has full column rank. The numeraire asset has positive payo,
R
A+1
> 0:
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We want to analyse the allocation that would result for any given terms of trade, that
is at any given prices of commodities and assets. Prices of commodities across states of the
world are p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
S
): The price of the numeraire commodity in state of the world s is
p
L+1;s
= 1: The domain of prices of commodities is P = fp 2 IR
(L+1)S
++
: p
L+1;s
= 1; s 2 Sg:
Prices of assets are q = (q
1
; : : : ; q
A+1
): The price of the numeraire asset is q
A+1
= 1: The
domain of prices of assets is Q = fq 2 IR
A+1
: q
A+1
= 1g:
On several occasions we want to truncate prices of commodities and prices of assets by
deleting the numeraires. Commodities (assets) other than the numeraire are

L = f1; : : : ; Lg
(

A = f1; : : : ; Ag). The domain of prices of commodities (assets) other than the numeraire
is

P = IR
LS
++
(

Q = IR
A
).
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium is typically ruled out. In com-
modities and assets other than the numeraire, endogenously determined rationing on net
trades serves to attain market clearing. To keep the presentation as simple as possible,
rationing is assumed to be uniform across individuals. Rationing in the supply (demand)
of commodities other than the numeraire is z 2  IR
LS
+
(z 2 IR
LS
+
). Rationing in the supply
(demand) of assets other than the numeraire is y 2  IR
A
+
(y 2 IR
A
+
):
At prices and rationing scheme (p; q; z; z; y; y); the budget set of individual i is

i
(p; q; z; z; y; y) =
n
(x; y) 2 X
i
 IR
A+1
: qy  0;
p
s
(x
s
  e
i
s
)  R
s
y; s 2 S;
z
l;s
 x
l;s
  e
i
l;s
 z
l;s
; (l; s) 2

L  S;
y
a
 y  y
a
; a 2

Ag:
The optimization problem of the individual is to choose a utility maximizing consumption
bundle and asset portfolio, denoted d
i
(p; q; z; z; y; y); in his budget set. Despite the dier-
entiability assumptions on primitives, the rationing constraints cause non-dierentiabilities
for the demand function.
At given prices and rationing scheme, an individual is eectively rationed in his supply
(demand) for a commodity or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing
scheme in the supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is eective
supply (demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least one
individual is eectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity or asset. At
a competitive equilibrium the prices and rationing scheme are such that there is neither
eective supply rationing nor eective demand rationing in the market for any commodity
or asset. This makes the competitive equilibrium a special case of a x-price equilibrium.
Denition 2.1 (Fix-price equilibrium) A x-price equilibrium for the economy E at
prices (p; q) 2 P  Q is a pair ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) such that
1. for every individual, (x
i
; y
i
) 2 d
i
(p; q; z

; z

; y

; y

);
2.
P
I
i=1
x
i
=
P
I
i=1
e
i
and
P
I
i=1
y
i
= 0;
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3. for every l 2

L; if for some i
0
x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z

l;s
; then for all i 2 I x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
< z

l;s
;
while if for some i
0
x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z

l;s
then for all i 2 I x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
> z

l;s
; and
4. for every a 2

A; if for some i
0
y
i
0

a
= y

a
; then for all i 2 I y
i
a
< y

a
; while if for some
i
0
y
i
0

a
= y

a
; then for all i 2 I y
i
a
> y

a
:
Conditions 1 and 2 are the usual optimization and market clearing conditions. Condi-
tions 3 and 4, together with the convexity of the consumption sets and the quasi-concavity
of the utility functions of individuals, imply that there is no eective rationing, simultane-
ously, on both sides of a market. This expresses that we do not depart from the scenario
of frictionless markets that characterizes competitive equilibria with incomplete markets.
Markets are still transparent in the sense that it is not possible to nd a buyer and a seller
in a single market that could benet from mutual exchange against the numeraire.
3 The Existence of Fix-price Equilibria
A fairly straightforward proof of the existence of a x-price equilibrium at prices (p; q)
can be given under A1-A4. Let
f
X
i
be a compact, convex subset of X
i
that contains the
aggregate initial endowment in the interior. The assumptions on utility functions and
on the asset return matrix imply that all S + 1 budget inequalities in the denition of
the budget set hold with equality at the optimal choice of an individual. The rationing
inequalities do not necessarily hold with equality. The budget set related to
f
X
i
with all
budget inequalities required to hold with equality is denoted
e

i
and the corresponding
demand function
e
d
i
: Since prices are xed at (p; q); they are omitted in the notation.
Lemma 3.1 If E satises A1-A4, then
e
d
i
; i 2 I; is continuous.
Proof Let (z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
) be a sequence that converges to (z; z; y; y): Then (
e
d
i
(z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
)) :
n = 1; : : :) has a convergent subsequence, with limit (
b
x;
b
y) 2
e

i
(z; z; y; y):
Suppose there exists (
e
x;
e
y) 2
e

i
(z; z; y; y); such that u
i
(
e
x) > u
i
(
b
x): Let
e
L
 
;
e
L
+
;
e
A
 
;
and
e
A
+
; denote the sets of non-numeraire commodities and non-numeraire assets for which
e
x
l;s
  e
i
l;s
is negative, positive,
e
y
a
is negative, and positive, respectively. For

n
= min
(
1;
z
n
l;s
e
x
l;s
  e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2
e
L
 
;
z
n
l;s
e
x
l;s
  e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2
e
L
+
;
y
n
a
e
y
a
; a 2
e
A
 
;
y
n
a
e
y
a
; a 2
e
A
+
)
;
e
x
n
= e
i
+ 
n
(
e
x   e
i
); n = 1; : : : ; and
e
y
n
= 
n
e
y; n = 1; : : : ; it can be veried that
(
e
x
n
;
e
y
n
) 2
e

i
(z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
): Evidently, lim
n!1

n
= 1; and lim
n!1
(
e
x
n
;
e
y
n
) = (
e
x;
e
y): By
the continuity of u
i
;
e
x
n
is strictly preferred to the consumption bundle in
e
d
i
(z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
);
a contradiction. 2
Since there is no rationing in the market of the numeraire asset nor in the market of
the numeraire commodities, the argument for equilibrium existence is not trivial.
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Proposition 3.2 If E satises A1-A4, then a x-price equilibrium exists at all prices
(p; q) 2 P Q:
Proof If ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is a x-price equilibrium of E at prices (p; q); then
x
i
0
l;s
<
P
I
i=1
e
i
l;s
+ "; with " some xed positive number. Since R has full column rank, this
implies that there is  > 0 such that ky
i
k
1
<  for any y
i
consistent with a x-price
equilibrium at prices (p; q):
The functions (z; z) : C
LS
!  IR
LS
+
 IR
LS
+
and (y; y) : C
A
!  IR
A
+
 IR
A
+
; where
C
K
= fr 2 IR
K
: 0  r
k
 1g denotes the unit cube of dimension K; are dened by
z
l;s
(r) =  minf2r
l;s
(
P
I
i=1
e
i
l;s
+ ");
P
I
i=1
e
i
l;s
+ "g; (l; s) 2

L  S;
z
l;s
(r) = minf(2  2r
l;s
)(
P
I
i=1
e
i
l;s
+ ");
P
I
i=1
e
i
l;s
+ "g; (l; s) 2

L  S;
y
a
() =  minf2
a
; g; a 2

A;
y
a
() = minf(2  2
a
); g; a 2

A:
We dene the excess demand function
e
z : C
LS
 C
A
! IR
LS
 IR
A
by
e
z
l;s
(r; ) =
P
I
i=1
e
d
i
l;s
(z(r); z(r); y(); y()) 
P
I
i=1
e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2

L S
e
z
a
(r; ) =
P
I
i=1
e
d
i
a
(z(r); z(r); y(); y()); a 2

A:
If (r

; 

) 2 C
LS
 C
A
is such that
e
z(r

; 

) = 0; then ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)); where
(x
i
; y
i
) =
e
d
i
(z

; z

; y

; y

); i 2 I; (z

; z

) = (z(r

); z(r

)); (y

; y

) = (y(r

); y(r

)); is a
x-price equilibrium. It is obvious that Conditions 1 and 2 of Denition 1 are satised
for non-numeraire commodities and assets. Using the budget equalities gives Conditions 1
and 2 for numeraire commodities and assets. The construction of the functions (z; z) and
(y; y) takes care of Conditions 3 and 4.
The set
e
z(C
LS
C
A
) is compact. Let the set ZY be a compact, convex set that contains
e
z(C
LS
 C
A
): The correspondence  : ZY ! C
LS
 C
A
is dened by
(z; y) = argmaxf
P
(l;s)2

LS
r
l;s
z
l;s
+
P
a2

A

a
y
a
: r 2 C
LS
;  2 C
A
g:
The correspondence ' : ZY  C
LS
 C
A
! ZY  C
LS
 C
A
is dened by '(z; y; r; ) =
f
e
z(r; )g  (z; y): It is a non-empty, compact, convex valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence dened on a non-empty, compact, convex set. By Kakutani's xed point
theorem, ' has a xed point, say (z

; y

; r

; 

):
If, for some a 2

A; y

a
< 0; then, by the denition of ; 

a
= 0; so y

a
 0; a contradiction.
If, for some a 2

A; y

a
> 0; then, by the denition of ; 

a
= 1; so y

a
 0; a contradiction.
Consequently, y

a
= 0; for all a 2

A: Moreover, y

A+1
=  
P
a2

A
q
a
y

a
= 0:
If, for some (l; s) 2

L  S; z

l;s
< 0; then, by the denition of ; r

l;s
= 0; so z

l;s
 0; a
contradiction. If, for some (l; s) 2

L  S; z

l;s
> 0; then, by the denition of ; r

l;s
= 1; so
z

l;s
 0; a contradiction. Consequently, z

l;s
= 0; for all (l; s) 2

L  S: Moreover, for every
s 2 S; z

L+1;s
=  
P
(l;s)2

LS
p
l;s
z

l;s
+R
s
y

= 0:
It follows that 0 2
e
z(r

; 

); so a x-price equilibrium at prices (p; q) exists. 2
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4 Local Comparative Statics
The state of markets at a x-price equilibrium can be described by a sign vector
r = (r
1;1
; : : : ; r
L;S
; r
1
; : : : ; r
A
):
If there is eective supply rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset, the associ-
ated component of the sign vector is -1, if there is eective demand rationing it is +1, and
if there is no eective rationing it is 0.
For a sign vector r; the set PQ(r) is the set of prices (p; q) 2 PQ; for which there exists
a x-price equilibrium at prices (p; q) with state of the markets r: For prices (p; q) 2 PQ;
the set of x-price equilibrium allocations is D(p; q), and, for a sign vector r; the set of
x-price equilibrium allocations with state of the markets r is D(p; q; r): In the following,
N

denotes a neighborhood of :
Denition 4.1 (Local uniqueness) Let ((p

; q

); (x

; y

)) be a competitive equilibrium
of E : The allocation (x

; y

) is locally unique as a x-price equilibrium allocation if there
exists a neighborhood N
x

;y

such that for every N
x

;y

 N
x

;y

there exists a neighborhood
N
p

;q

with D(p; q) \N
x

;y

a singleton for every (p; q) 2 N
p

;q

:
If a competitive equilibrium allocation is locally unique as a x-price equilibrium allo-
cation, then, for prices close to competitive equilibrium prices, there is exactly one x-price
equilibrium allocation close to the competitive allocation.
For a locally unique competitive equilibrium allocation, for each sign vector r; we dene
the function (
b
x
r
;
b
y
r
) : N
p

;q

\PQ(r)! IR
I(L+1)S+I(A+1)
by associating the unique x-price
equilibrium allocation in N
x

;y

\ D(p; q; r) to (p; q):
Comparative statics require a dierentiable form of local uniqueness.
Denition 4.2 (Dierentiable local uniqueness) Let ((p

; q

); (x

; y

)) be a competi-
tive equilibrium of E : The allocation (x

; y

) is dierentiably locally unique as a x-price
equilibrium allocation if it is locally unique and there is a neighborhood N
p

;q

such that,
for every sign vector r; the function (
b
x
r
;
b
y
r
)
jN
p

;q

\PQ(r)
is dierentiable
2
.
Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) prove for a complete asset market that, generically,
the set of x-price equilibrium allocations can be represented by a nite number of con-
tinuously dierentiable functions of prices. Nevertheless, the results in Laroque (1978)
and the examples in Madden (1982) show that competitive equilibria need not be locally
unique as x-price equilibria. Even though x-price equilibrium allocations exist for all
prices, there may be robust local non-existence, and therefore local non-uniqueness as a
x-price equilibrium, at competitive prices. The equilibrium manifold has a particularly
complicated structure at competitive prices. We analyse the local comparative statics of
2
A function with domain a subset of Euclidean space which is not necessarily open is dierentiable if
it has a dierentiable extension to an open neighborhood of its domain of denition.
6
x-price equilibria in the neighborhood of a competitive price system. This analysis follows
Laroque (1978, 1981) for economies with a complete asset market and leads to necessary
and sucient conditions for dierentiable local uniqueness.
Consider the optimization problem an individual faces when determining his demand.
The Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints in the markets for
commodities (assets) are denoted  (): The individual optimization problem leads us to
study a modied demand function,
b
d
i
: At prices and Lagrange multipliers (p; q; ; );
b
d
i
is
dened by the solution to the optimization problem
max u
i
(x) 
P
(l;s)2

LS

l;s
x
l;s
 
P
a2

A

a
y
a
;
s.t. qy  0;
p
s
(x
s
  e
i
s
)  R
s
y; s 2 S:
The set of (p; q; ; ) on which each individual optimization problem has a solution is
denoted N : It is easily veried that N is a neighborhood of (p

; q

; 0; 0); whenever (p

; q

)
are competitive equilibrium prices.
Lemma 4.3 If E satises A1-A4, then
b
d
i
; i 2 I; is continuously dierentiable on N :
Proof It follows from a standard application of the implicit function theorem. 2
At a competitive equilibrium ((p

; q

); (x

; y

)); z
 
l;s
; z
+
l;s
; y
 
a
and y
+
a
; dened by
z
 
l;s
= min
i2I
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
; z
+
l;s
= max
i2I
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2

L S;
y
 
a
= min
i2I
y
i
a
; y
+
a
= max
i2I
y
i
a
; a 2

A;
determine the minimal and the maximal excess demands on both the spot and the asset
markets. If
I
l;s
= fi 2 I : x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
= z
 
l;s
g; I
l;s
= fi 2 I : x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
= z
+
l;s
g; (l; s) 2

L S;
I
a
= fi 2 I : y
i
a
= y
 
a
g; I
a
= fi 2 I : y
i
a
= y
+
a
g; a 2

A;
then in a neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium, only individuals in I
l;s
(I
l;s
) may
be rationed on supply (demand) in the spot market (l; s); and only individuals in I
a
(I
a
)
on supply (demand) in the asset market a:
Lemma 4.4 Let ((X
i
; u
i
)
i2I
; R) satisfy A1, A2 and A4. For an open set of endowments
with full Lebesgue measure 
  IR
I(L+1)S
++
; for any competitive equilibrium ((p

; q

); (x

; y

))
of E ; j I
l;s
j=j I
l;s
j= 1; (l; s) 2

L  S; and j I
a
j=j I
a
j= 1; a 2

A:
Proof It follows from a standard transversality argument. 2
There is a generic set of economies for which there is exactly one individual in each mar-
ket with the minimal excess demand and exactly one individual with the maximal excess
demand. For the remainder of this section, we consider an economy E with endowments in
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the set 
 and study the local structure of the set x-price equilibria in the neighborhood
of a competitive equilibrium ((p

; q

); (x

; y

)) of E :
For every individual, the function c
i
: IR
LS
 IR
A
! IR
LS
 IR
A
is dened by
c
i
l;s
(; ) =
(

l;s
; if 
l;s
 0 and fig = I
l;s
; or 
l;s
 0 and fig = I
l;s
;
0; otherwise;
c
i
a
(; ) =
(

a
; if 
a
 0 and fig = I
a
; or 
a
 0 and fig = I
a
;
0; otherwise:
The function c relates the Lagrange multipliers (; ) to the x-price equilibria in the neigh-
borhood of the competitive equilibrium. The aggregate modied excess demand function
for commodities and assets other than the numeraire is
b
z : N ! IR
LS+A
dened by
b
z
l;s
(p; q; ; ) =
P
i2I
b
d
i
l;s
(p; q; c
i
(; )) 
P
i2I
e
i
; (l; s) 2

L  S;
b
z
a
(p; q; ; ) =
P
i2I
b
d
i
a
(p; q; c
i
(; )); a 2

A:
It is sucient to restrict attention to the zero points of
b
z to analyze x-price equilibria in
the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium. Choose neighborhoods N
i
x
i
;y
i
such that
for every (x; y) 2 N
x

;y

= 
i2I
N
i
x
i
;y
i
; for all (l; s) 2

L S; for all a 2

A;
x
i
0
l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
< 0 and x
i
0
l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
< x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
; i 6= i
0
; i
0
2 I
l;s
x
i
0
l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
> 0 and x
i
0
l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
> x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
; i 6= i
0
; i
0
2 I
l;s
y
i
0
a
< 0 and y
i
0
a
< y
i
a
; i 6= i
0
; i
0
2 I
a
y
i
0
a
> 0 and y
i
0
a
> y
i
a
; i 6= i
0
; i
0
2 I
a
:
Lemma 4.5 Let E satisfy A1-A4 with endowments in 
; and let ((p

; q

); (x

; y

)) be a
competitive equilibrium. Consider some (x; y) 2 N
x

;y

: Then (x; y) 2 D(p; q) if and only if
there is (p; q; ; ) 2 N such that
b
d
i
(p; q; c
i
(; )) = (x
i
; y
i
); i 2 I; and
b
z(p; q; ; ) = (0; 0):
Proof It follows from the rst order conditions for a x-price equilibrium and the rst
order conditions for the solution to the individual optimization problems leading to
b
d
i
: 2
The function
b
z is Lipschitz continuous because of the dierentiability of the functions
b
d
i
and the Lipschitz continuity of the functions c
i
: It is dierentiable at each (p; q; ; ) 2
N where all components of  and  are non-zero. For each sign vector r without zero
components, we dene
N
r
= f(p; q; ; ) 2 N : 
l;s
r
l;s
> 0; (l; s) 2

L S; 
a
r
a
> 0; a 2

Ag:
The function
b
z is dierentiable on N
r
: The limit of its Jacobian, lim
n!1
@
b
z(p
n
; q
n
; 
n
; 
n
);
along a sequence ((p
n
; q
n
; 
n
; 
n
) 2 N
r
: n = 1; : : :) that converges to (p

; q

; 0; 0) exists
and is denoted @
b
z
r
(p

; q

; 0; 0): It holds that
@
p;q
b
z
r
l;s
(p

; q

; 0; 0) =
P
i2I
@
p;q
b
d
i
l;s
(p

; q

; 0; 0) = @
p;q
z
l;s
(p

; q

);
@
p;q
b
z
r
a
(p

; q

; 0; 0) =
P
i2I
@
p;q
b
d
i
a
(p

; q

; 0; 0) = @
p;q
z
a
(p

; q

);
where z(p; q) denotes the unconstrained total excess demand function for commodities and
assets other than the numeraires at prices (p; q): It follows that the Jacobian with respect
to (p; q) is independent of r at a competitive equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.6 Let E satisfy A1-A4 with endowments in 
; and let ((p

; q

); (x

; y

))
be a competitive equilibrium such that @z(p

; q

) is of full rank. For each sign vector r
without zero components, the tangent cone at (p

; q

) to the set of price systems having a
local x-price equilibrium with state of the markets r is
f(p; q) 2 P  Q : (p; q) = (@z(p

; q

))
 1
@
;
b
z
r
(p

; q

; 0; 0)(; );

l;s
r
l;s
> 0; (l; s) 2

L  S; 
a
r
a
> 0; a 2

Ag:
Proof The restriction of
b
z to N
r
extends to a dierentiable function
e
z : N ! IR
LS+A
as follows. For i 2 I; the function
e
c
i
is dened by
e
c
i
l;s
(; ) = 
l;s
if i 2 I
l;s
; r
l;s
=  1; or
i 2 I
l;s
; r
l;s
= +1;
e
c
i
l;s
(; ) = 0 otherwise, and
e
c
i
a
(; ) = 
a
if i 2 I
a
; r
a
=  1; or i 2 I
a
;
r
a
= +1; and
e
c
i
a
(; ) = 0 otherwise. The function
e
z is dened as
b
z with c replaced by
e
c:
Since @z(p

; q

) is of full rank, it follows by the implicit function theorem that the solution
to
e
z(p; q; ; ) = (0; 0) determines p and q as a function of  and  in a neighborhood
of (0; 0): The derivative of this function at (0; 0) with respect to  and  is given by
(@z(p

; q

))
 1
@
;
e
z(p

; q

; 0; 0): The expression in the proposition follows immediately if
one takes into account that only 's and 's satisfying 
l;s
r
l;s
> 0; (l; s) 2

L  S; and

a
r
a
> 0; a 2

A; should be considered. 2
Proposition 2 in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) shows that the assumption
that @z(p

; q

) has full rank at every competitive equilibrium holds generically in initial
endowments. Proposition 4.6 characterizes the tangent cones to the regions in the price
space having a x-price equilibrium with state of the markets r in the neighborhood of
a competitive equilibrium. It guarantees neither that the closures of these tangent cones
cover the price space nor that the tangent cones are full-dimensional nor that the tangent
cones do not intersect. If this were the case, local uniqueness would result.
In general, an increase in a price causes a dierent individual to be rationed as a
decrease in a price. Since @
;
b
z
r
; and therefore the tangent cone, depends on @
;
b
d
i
for the
individual i that is rationed, the fact that the tangent cones need not t nicely together
does not come as a surprice. In abstract terms, the fact that dierent individuals get
rationed at dierent prices in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium, creates non-
dierentiabilities in the function
b
z at competitive prices. At a point of non-dierentiability,
the implicit function theorem need not apply, and local uniqueness may fail.
The generalized Jacobian of a Lipschitz continuous function f at a point x is the
convex hull of all matrices that are the limits of the sequence (@f(x
n
) : n = 1; : : :); where
(x
n
: n = 1; : : :) is a convergent sequence with lim
n!1
x
n
= x and f is dierentiable at
x
n
; n = 1; : : : :
If a function f is Lipschitz continuous, f(
b
x;
b
y) = 0; and every matrix M in @
x
f(
b
x;
b
y)
has full rank, then there exist a neighborhood N
bx;by
; a neighborhood N
by
; and a Lipschitz
continuous function g on N
by
such that (x; y) 2 N
bx;by
and f(x; y) = 0 if and only if y 2 N
by
and x = g(y):
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Proposition 4.7 Let E satisfy A1-A4 with endowments in 
; and let ((p

; q

); (x

; y

))
be a competitive equilibrium. If the determinants of the matrices @
;
b
z
r
(p

; q

; 0; 0); with r
sign vectors without zero components, are either all equal to  1 or all equal to +1; then the
competitive equilibrium allocation is dierentiably locally unique as a x-price equilibrium
allocation.
Proof The argument is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, Laroque (1981). 2
There are utility functions and asset return matrices such that the set of endowments,
for which all determinants in Proposition 4.7 have the same sign, has full Lebesgue mea-
sure. Consider an economy with an arbitrary number of individuals, three states of the
world, two commodities and two assets. The utility functions have an additively separable
representation u
i
=
P
s2S

s
u
i
s
with
u
i
s
(x
s
) = 
i
lnx
1;s
+ (1  
i
)x
2;s
; 0 < 
i
< 1;
and a uniform probability measure  over the states of the world. The payos of the assets
are R
1
= (1; 0; 0)
0
; and R
2
= (0; 1; 0)
0
: Endowments are chosen such that j I
l;s
j=j I
l;s
j= 1;
(l; s) 2

LS; and j I
a
j=j I
a
j= 1; a 2

A; so they belong to a set of full Lebesgue measure
by Lemma 4.4.
Let (p

; q

) be competitive equilibrium prices in this economy. All partial derivatives
are evaluated at (p

; q

; 0; 0): It holds that @

1;s
b
z
r
= @

1;s
b
d
i(1;s)
; where fi(1; s)g = I
1;s
if r
1;s
=  1; and fi(1; s)g = I
1;s
if r
1;s
= +1: An increase in 
1;s
corresponds to the
introduction of demand rationing or the disappearance of supply rationing on commodity
(1; s); which decreases the demand for commodity (1; s); so @

1;s
b
z
r
1;s
is negative. The
change in income spent on commodity (1; s) equals p

1;s
@

1;s
b
z
r
1;s
: The individual i(1) is the
one aected by rationing in the asset market, so fi(1)g = I
1
if r
1
=  1; and fi(1)g = I
1
if
r
1
= +1: Using the properties of the Cobb-Douglas utility function it follows that
@

1;1
b
d
i(1;1)
1;2
=
 
i(1;1)
1
p

1;1
q

1
@

1;1
bz
r
1;1
p

1;2
q

2
(2 
i(1;1)
1
)
; @

1;1
b
d
i(1;1)
1;3
= 0; @

1;1
b
d
i(1;1)
1
=
p

1;1
@

1;1
bz
r
1;1
(2 
i(1;1)
1
)
;
@

1;2
b
d
i(1;2)
1;1
=
 
i(1;2)
1
p

1;2
q

1
@

1;2
bz
r
1;2
p

1;1
q

2
(2 
i(1;2)
1
)
; @

1;2
b
d
i(1;2)
1;3
= 0; @

1;2
b
d
i(1;2)
1
=
 p

1;2
q

2
@

1;2
bz
r
1;2
q

1
(2 
i(1;2)
1
)
;
@

1;3
b
d
i(1;3)
1;1
= 0; @

1;3
b
d
i(1;3)
1;2
= 0; @

1;3
b
d
i(1;3)
1
= 0;
@

1
b
d
i(1)
1;1
=

i(1)
1
@

1
bz
r
1
p

1;1
; @

1
b
d
i(1)
1;2
=
 
i(1)
1
q

1
@

1
bz
r
1
p

1;2
q

2
; @

1
b
d
i(1)
1;3
= 0:
The sign of the determinant of @
;
b
z
r
does not change by premultiplying it by the strictly
positive row vector (p

1;1
q

1
; p

1;2
q

2
; 1; q

1
) and postmultiplying it by the strictly positive col-
umn vector ((2 
i(1;1)
1
)= p

1;1
q

1
@

1;1
b
z
r
1;1
; (2 
i(1;2)
1
)= p

1;2
q

2
@

1;2
b
z
r
1;2
; 1= 
b
z
r
1;3
; 1= q

1
@

1
bz
r
1
)
0
:
The resulting matrix is given by
2
6
6
6
6
6
4

i(1;1)
1
  2 
i(1;2)
1
0  
i(1)
1

i(1;1)
1

i(1;2)
2
  2 0 
i(1)
1
0 0  1 0
 1 1 0  1
3
7
7
7
7
7
5
10
and its determinant equals
(4  2
i(1;1)
1
  2
i(1;2)
1
)(1  
i(1)
1
) > 0:
The determinant of @
;
b
z
r
is positive, irrespective of the sign vector r: It follows by Propo-
sition 4.7 that the competitive equilibrium allocation is dierentiably locally unique as a
x-price equilibrium allocation.
As in Laroque (1981), whenever there are two sign vectors without zero components
r
1
and r
2
such that the determinants of @
;
b
z
r
1
(p

; q

; 0; 0) and @
;
b
z
r
2
(p

; q

; 0; 0) have
opposite signs and @z(p

; q

) has full rank, then for every neighborhood N
x

;y

there exists
for every neighborhood N
p

;q

a price system (p; q) 2 N
p

;q

with at least two x-price
equilibrium allocations in N
x

;y

: The conditions in Proposition 4.7 are almost necessary.
Local uniqueness of x-price equilibrium allocations at competitive equilibria is not too
strong a requirement. It is less demanding than the requirement of uniqueness of x-price
equilibrium allocations at prices in a neighborhood of competitive prices. It is an open
question whether the interior of the set of endowments for which all competitive equilib-
rium allocations of the economy are dierentiably locally unique as x-price equilibrium
allocations can be empty. The set of initial endowments for which the dierentiable local
uniqueness property holds, is denoted 


: In the sequel we restrict attention to endowments
in 


:
The function (
b
x;
b
y) : N
p

;q

! IR
I(L+1)S+I(A+1)
associates the unique x-price equilib-
rium allocation in N
x

;y

to (p; q) 2 N
p

;q

: The indirect utility function of an individual at
a locally unique x-price equilibrium is dened by
v
i
(p; q) = u
i
(
b
x
i
(p; q)); (p; q) 2 N
p

;q

:
Proposition 4.8 Let E satisfy A1-A4 with endowments in 


; and let ((p

; q

); (x

; y

))
be a competitive equilibrium. The indirect utility function v
i
: N
p

;q

! IR is dierentiable
and
@
p
l;s
v
i
(p

; q

) =  @
x
L+1;s
u
i
(x
i
)(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
); (l; s) 2

L  S:
Proof For every sign vector r; the restriction of v
i
to N
p

;q

\ PQ(r); denoted v
i
r
; is
dierentiable. From the dierentiation of the budget constraints
q
b
y
i
r
(p; q) = 0 and p
s
(
b
x
i
r
s
(p; q)  e
i
s
) = R
s
b
y
i
r
(p; q); s 2 S;
with respect to p
l;s
; and the rst order conditions for individual optimization at a compet-
itive equilibrium,
@
x
i
l;s
u
i
(x
i
) = @
x
i
L+1;s
u
i
(x
i
)p

l;s
; (l; s) 2

L  S;
X
s2S
@
x
i
L+1;s
u
i
(x
i
)R
s
= 
i
q

; for some 
i
> 0;
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it follows that
@
p
l;s
v
i
r
(p

; q

) =  @
x
i
L+1;s
u
i
(x
i
)(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
):
Since the derivative is independent of the sign vector r; the result follows. 2
The eect of a change in the spot market price of commodity (l; s) 2

L S is equal to
minus the marginal utility of the numeraire commodity in state s multiplied by the excess
demand of commodity (l; s) at the competitive equilibrium. Proposition 4.8 implies that
the indirect welfare eects of a change in prices, generated by the induced change in the
rationing constraints and agents' choices, equal zero.
5 Pareto Improving Price Regulation
Price regulation can Pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium ((p

; q

); (x

; y

)) if there
exist prices of commodities p such that a x-price equilibrium of commodities at prices of
commodities and assets (p; q

) Pareto dominates the allocation x

: The ambiguity intro-
duced by the possibility of multiple x-price equilibrium allocations at prices (p; q

) is
circumvented by considering local variations at competitive equilibrium allocations that
are dierentiably locally unique as x-price equilibria.
Denition 5.1 (Pareto improving price regulation) A competitive equilibrium ((p

;
q

); (x

; y

)) can be Pareto improved by price regulation if it is dierentiably locally unique
as x-price equilibrium and there exists an innitesimal variation in commodity prices dp
such that
P
(l;s)2

LS
@
p
l;s
v
i
(p

; q

)dp
l;s
> 0; i 2 I:
The competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by uniform price regulation if it
can be Pareto improved by a price regulation with dp
s
= dp
s
0
; s; s
0
2 S:
Pareto improvement by price regulation is possible only if the asset market is incom-
plete. Another necessary requirement is that the economy allows for heterogeneous indi-
viduals. This is summarized in the following assumption.
A5. A+ 1 < S and I > 1:
The function ' is dened by
'(x;
e
;
e
p; e) =
0
B
B
B
B
@
@u
i
(x
i
) 
e

i
e
p; i 2 I
P
s2S
e
p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
); i 2 I
P
i2I
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
); (l; s) 2 L  S n f(L+ 1; S)g
P
s2S
n
s
e
p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
); i 2 I n f1g
1
C
C
C
C
A
;
where the Lagrangian multiplier
e

i
2 IR does not vary with the state of the world, the prices
of commodities
e
p 2 IR
(L+1)S 1
++
f1g are discounted prices, with only the price of commodity
(L + 1; S) normalized to 1, and n 6= 0 is a xed vector such that nR = 0: Consider the
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standard reformulation of the incomplete markets model in discounted prices that utilizes
the Cass trick. The rst individual is assumed to be unconstrained, so his marginal utility
at an optimal choice is proportional to the price system. Pareto optimality implies that
the marginal utility vectors of all agents should be proportional to the price system. The
function ' is completed by specifying budget constraints and market clearing conditions,
and one condition for every individual but the rst that recognizes the incompleteness
of markets:
P
s2S
n
s
e
p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
) = 0: The existence of n 6= 0 such that nR = 0 follows
from market incompleteness. It follows that the function ' vanishes at a Pareto optimal
competitive equilibrium.
We use the following as a general notation. For a function f that depends on a vector
of variables  and on endowments e; f
e
() denotes the function that results from xing e:
For instance, '
e
(x;
e
;
e
p) = '(x;
e
;
e
p; e):
Lemma 5.2 Let E satisfy A1, A2, A4 and A5. For an open set of endowments with full
Lebesgue measure in IR
I(L+1)S
++
; competitive equilibrium allocations are not Pareto optimal.
Proof A necessary condition for x to be a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium al-
location for an economy e is that '
e
(x;
e
;
e
p) = 0: Since the dimension of the domain of
'
e
is lower than the dimension of the range, whenever '
e
is transverse to 0; a solution
to '
e
(x;
e
;
e
p) = 0 does not exist. By a standard argument, ' is transverse to 0. By the
transversal density theorem, the set of economies for which '
e
is transverse to 0 has full
Lebesgue measure. By a standard argument, this set can be chosen to be open. 2
The function  :  


! IR
N
is dened by
 (; e) =
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
@
x
i
s
u
i
(x
i
)  
i
s
p
s
; i 2 I; s 2 S
p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
)  R
s
y
i
; i 2 I; s 2 S

i
R  
i
q; i 2 I
P
i2I
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
); (l; s) 2

L  S
P
i2I
y
i
a
; a 2

A
qy
i
; i 2 I
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
;
where  = (x; ; y; ; p; q) and  = IR
I(L+1)S
++
 IR
IS
++
 IR
I(A+1)
 IR
I


P 

Q: The dimension
of  is denoted by N:When 

is consistent with a competitive equilibrium, it is necessarily
the case that  
e
(

) = 0:
The function h :  IR
I
 


! IR
LS+1
is dened by
h(; ; e) =
 
P
i2I

i

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
); (l; s) 2

L  S
P
i2I
(
i
)
2
  1
!
:
A competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by price regulation if the matrix of
partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to prices has full rank
3
.
3
If the matrix of partial derivatives has full rank, it is possible to generate any desired marginal change
in utilities by means of price regulation.
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By Proposition 4.8, this matrix is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no solution to
 
e
() = 0 in combination with h
e
(; ) = 0:
The function
e
 :  IR
I
 


! IR
N+LS+1
is dened by
e
 (; ; e) =
 
 (; e)
h(; ; e)
!
:
If
e
 is transverse to 0, then it follows from the transversal density theorem that for a
subset of endowments of full Lebesgue measure,
e
 
e
is transverse to 0. If LS  I; then
the dimension of the range of
e
 
e
exceeds that of the domain. Transversality of
e
 
e
implies
that there are no solutions to the associated system of equations. It is possible to Pareto
improve all competitive equilibria by price regulation.
Proposition 5.3 Let E satisfy A1, A2, A4 and A5. If LS  I; then for an open subset of
endowments in 


with full Lebesgue measure, all competitive equilibria of E can be Pareto
improved by price regulation.
Proof One xes (l; s) 2

L  S and 


; an open subset of endowments in 


of full
Lebesgue measure, such that no competitive equilibrium of the associated economy E is
Pareto optimal. The function
b
 :  


! IR
N+1
is dened by
b
 (; e) =
0
@
 (; e)
P
s2Snfsg
P
i2I

i
s

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
)
1
A
:
We show that if
b
 (; e) = 0; then the matrix
c
M of partial derivatives of
b
 evaluated at
(; e) has full row rank: if v
0
c
M = 0; then v = 0: The components of v are denoted v
1;i;l;s
;
i 2 I; (l; s) 2 L  S; v
2;i;s
; i 2 I; s 2 S; v
3;i;a
; i 2 I; a 2 A; v
4;l;s
; (l; s) 2

L  S; v
5;a
;
a 2

A; v
6;i
; i 2 I; and v
9
; according to the labelling of the equations dening
b
 :
If v is such that v
0
c
M = 0; then 0 = v
0
@
e
i
L+1;s
b
 (; e) =  v
2;i;s
; i 2 I; s 2 S: It follows
that, for i 2 I;
0 = v
0
@
e
i
l;s
b
 (; e) =  v
4;l;s
; (l; s) 2 (

L n flg) S;
0 = v
0
@
e
i
l;s
b
 (; e) =  v
4;l;s
  v
9

i
s

i
s
= 0; s 2 S n fsg;
0 = v
0
@
e
i
l;s
b
 (; e) =  v
4;l;s
:
Consequently, if v
4;l;bs
= 0 for some
b
s 2 S nfsg; then v
9
= 0 and v
4;l;s
= 0; for all s 2 S nfsg:
If, on the contrary, v
4;l;s
6= 0; for all s 2 S n f
b
sg; then

i
s

i
s
=  
v
4;l;s
v
9
=

i
0
s

i
0
s
; i; i
0
2 I; s 2 S n f
s
g:
Hence, for i; i
0
2 I; for s
1
; s
2
2 S; 
i
s
1
=
i
s
2
= (
i
s
1
=
i
s
)(
i
s
=
i
s
2
) = (
i
0
s
1
=
i
0
s
)(
i
0
s
=
i
0
s
2
) =

i
0
s
1
=
i
0
s
2
: The economy e has then a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium induced by ;
contradicting e 2 


: Consequently, v
4;l;s
= 0; s 2 S n fsg; and v
9
= 0:
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For i 2 I; for (l; s) 2 L  S;
0 = v
0
@
x
i
l;s
b
 (; e) = v
0
1;i;;
@
x
i
l;s
@u
i
(x
i
):
It is possible to represent a utility function satisfying A2 by one with @
2
u
i
(x
i
) negative
denite on a bounded subset of the consumption set. Then it follows that v
1;i;;
= 0:
For i 2 I; 0 = v
0
@
y
i
A+1
b
 (; e) = v
8;i
: Also, for a 2

A; 0 = v
0
@
y
i
a
b
 (; e) = v
5;a
: Finally,
0 = v
0
@

i
s
b
 (; e) = v
0
3;i;
R
0
s
; i 2 I; s 2 S: Since R has full column rank it follows that
v
3;i;a
= 0; i 2 I; a 2 A:
Therefore, v = 0;
c
M has full row rank N + 1; and
b
 is transverse to 0: The set of
endowments such that
b
 
e
is transverse to zero is denoted
b


l;s
: By the transversal density
proposition, 


n
b


l;s
has Lebesgue measure zero. For e 2
b


l;s
; the dimension of the range
of
b
 
e
exceeds that of the domain, so (
b
 
e
)
 1
(f0g) = ;:
The set
b

 = \
(l;s)2

LS
b


l;s
is of full Lebesgue measure and, by a standard argument,
open. Redene the function
e
 such that endowments belong to 


\
b

: For (; ; e) such
that
e
 (; ; e) = 0;
f
M is the matrix of partial derivatives of
e
 evaluated at (; ; e):
Let v be such that v
0
f
M = 0: The components of v are denoted by v
1;i;l;s
; v
2;i;s
; v
3;i;a
;
v
4;l;s
; v
5;a
; v
6;i
; v
7;l;s
; and v
8
: Then, 0 = v
0
@
e
i
L+1;s
e
 (; ; e) =  v
2;i;s
; i 2 I; s 2 S: Hence,
0 = v
0
@
e
i
l;s
e
 (; ; e) =  v
4;l;s
  
i

i
s
v
7;l;s
; i 2 I; (l; s) 2

L  S:
Since
P
i2I
(
i
)
2
= 1; there is i
0
such that 
i
0
6= 0: If there is s 2 S such that, for i 2 I nfi
0
g;

i
0

i
0
s
  
i

i
s
= 0; then, for any l 2

L;
0 =
P
s2Snfsg
P
i2I

i

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) =
P
s2Snfsg
P
i2I

i
0

i
0
s

i
s

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
)
= 
i
0

i
0
s
P
s2Snfsg
P
i2I

i
s

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
):
Since 
i
0
6= 0;
P
s2Snfsg
P
i2I
(
i
s
=
i
s
)(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) = 0; a contradiction since e 2
b

: Conse-
quently, for every s 2 S; there is i 2 I n fi
0
g such that 
i
0

i
0
s
 
i

i
s
6= 0: For (l; s) 2

LS;
(
i
0

i
0
s
 
i

i
s
)v
7;l;s
= 0; so v
7;l;s
= 0; and, thus v
4;l;s
= 0: Also, 0 = v
0
@

i
0
e
 (; ; e) = 2
i
0
v
8
;
so, since 
i
0
6= 0; v
8
= 0: It follows as in the rst part of the proof that v
1;i;l;s
= 0; i 2 I;
(l; s) 2

L S; that v
6;i
= 0; i 2 I; that v
5;a
= 0; a 2

A; and that v
3;i;a
= 0; i 2 I; a 2 A:
Therefore,
f
M has rank N + LS + 1 and
e
 intersects 0 transversally. If
e

 is the set of
economies such that
e
 
e
is transverse to 0, then 


n
e

 has Lebesgue measure zero by the
transversal density theorem. Openness follows by a standard argument. 2
Generically, it is possible to make every individual better o by choosing appropriate
price regulations on the spot markets when asset markets are incomplete. One needs at
least as many instruments, LS; as individuals, I: Proposition 5.3 makes clear that this is
all one needs. This is not the case in the constrained suboptimality result of Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986), which applies when 2L  I  L(S   1) + 1:
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A competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by uniform price regulation if the
matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to uniform price
regulation has full rank.
The function k :  IR
I
 


! IR
L+1
is dened by
k(; ; e) =
 
P
s2S
h
l;s
(x; ; ; e); l 2

L
P
i2I
(
i
)
2
  1
!
:
By Proposition 4.8, the matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with
respect to uniform price regulation is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no solution
to  
e
() = 0 in combination with k
e
(; ) = 0:
Proposition 5.4 Let E satisfy A1, A2, A4 and A5. If L  I; then for an open subset of
endowments in 


with full Lebesgue measure, all competitive equilibria of E can be Pareto
improved by uniform price regulation.
Proof The argument follows that in the proof of Proposition 5.3. The equations related to
h that characterize Pareto improving price regulation are replaced by the equations related
to k that characterize Pareto improvements by uniform price regulation. This denes a
function  : The matrix M gives the partial derivatives of  evaluated at some (; ; e)
with  (; ; e) = 0: If v
0
M = 0; by considering the partial derivatives with respect to e
i
l;s
;
it follows that v
2;i;s
= 0; i 2 I; s 2 S; and v
4;l;s
+ 
i

i
s
v
7;l
= 0; i 2 I; (l; s) 2

L  S: If i
0
is
such that 
i
0
6= 0; and if s 2 S such that, for i 2 I n fi
0
g; 
i
0

i
0
s
  
i

i
s
= 0; then
0 =
P
i2I

i
P
s2S

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) = 
i
0

i
0
s
P
i2I
P
s2S

i
s

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
)
=
P
i2I
P
s2S

i
s

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) =
P
i2I
P
s2Snfsg

i
s

i
s
(x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
); l 2

L;
which contradicts e 2
b

: It follows that v
4;l;s
= 0; (l; s) 2

L  S; and v
7;l
= 0; l 2

L: The
remainder of the proof follows the argument in the proof of Proposition 6. 2
Uniform price regulation is eective when L  I; which reects again that the number
of instruments has to exceed the number of objectives. It complements the constrained
suboptimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), which applies when 2L 
I  L(S   1) + 1:
6 An Example
Consider an economy with two individuals, three states of the world, two commodities, and
two assets. The utility function of individual i has an additively separable representation,
u
i
=
P
s2S

s
u
i
s
; with state dependent cardinal utility
u
i
s
(x
s
) = 
i
s
lnx
1;s
+ 
i
s
x
2;s
; 
i
s
> 0; 
i
s
> 0;
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and a strictly positive probability measure (
1
; : : : ; 
S
) over the states of the world. The
payos of assets are R
1
= (0; 1; 1)
0
; and R
2
= (1; 0; 0)
0
: The payos of assets allow for the
following interpretation. Consumption at state of the world 1 is concurrent with the trade
in assets, while the only asset available, traded against consumption, is an indexed bond
with state-independent payos.
The parameters in the utility functions of individuals and their endowments are such
that
 =

1

1
1

2

1
2
+
3

1
3
=

1

2
1

2

2
2
+
3

2
3
;
and, for 
i
s
= 
i
s
=
i
s
;
max

 e
1
2;s
+

1
s
e
2
1;s
 
2
s
e
1
1;s
e
1
1;s
+e
2
1;s
: s = 2; 3; e
2
2;1
+ 

2
1
e
1
1;1
 
1
1
e
2
1;1
e
1
1;1
+e
2
1;1

 min

e
1
2;1
+ 

2
1
e
1
1;1
 
1
1
e
2
1;1
e
1
1;1
+e
2
1;1
; e
2
2;s
+

1
s
e
2
1;s
 
2
s
e
1
1;s
e
1
1;s
+e
2
1;s
: s = 2; 3

;
which eliminates equilibria at the boundaries of their consumption sets
4
.
Fix-price equilibrium exists for all prices of commodities, p; and prices of assets q =
1

:
We assume i to be the individual such that 
i
s
=e
i
1;s
 
i
0
s
=e
i
0
1;s
and consider four dierent
cases: (i) 0 < p
s


i
s
e
i
1;s
; (ii)

i
s
e
i
1;s
 p
s


i
s
+
i
0
s
e
i
1;s
+e
i
0
1;s
; (iii)

i
s
+
i
0
s
e
i
1;s
+e
i
0
1
s
 p
s


i
0
s
e
i
0
1;s
; and (iv)

i
0
s
e
i
0
1;s
 p
s
:
(i) If 0 < p
s
 
i
s
=e
i
1;s
; both individuals have an excess demand for commodity 1.
Equilibria obtain for z

s
= 0; x
i
1;s
= e
i
1;s
; x
i
0

1;s
= e
i
0
1;s
; and y
i
0

=  y
i
: At s = 1; x
i
2;1
=
e
i
2;1
  (1=)y
i
; x
i
0

2;1
= e
i
0
2;1
+ (1=)y
i
; y
i
 e
i
2;1
; and y
i
  e
i
0
2;1
: At s = 2 or s = 3;
x
i
2;s
= e
i
2;s
+ y
i
; x
i
0

2;s
= e
i
0
2;s
  y
i
; y
i
  e
i
2;s
; and y
i
 e
i
0
2;s
: The remaining parameters of
the rationing scheme are set so as not to be binding. Owing to the linearity of utility in the
amount consumed of the numeraire commodity in each state, the demand for the numeraire
commodities is not uniquely determined in equilibrium. There is a trade-o between more
consumption of the numeraire commodity in state 1 and an amount of consumption of the
numeraire commodity in both states 2 and 3. This does not aect the utility levels reached.
(ii) If 
i
s
=e
i
1;s
 p
s
 (
i
s
+ 
i
0
s
)=(e
i
1;s
+ e
i
0
1;s
); there is aggregate excess demand for com-
modity 1, but individual i supplies the commodity, and trade takes place, with individual
i
0
rationed on his demand of the commodity. Equilibria obtain for z

1;s
= e
i
1;s
 
i
s
=p
s
; x
i
1;s
=

i
s
=p
s
; x
i
0

1;s
= e
i
0
1;s
+e
i
1;s
 
i
s
=p
s
; and y
i
0

=  y
i
: At s = 1; x
i
2;1
= p
1
e
i
1;1
+e
i
2;1
 
i
1
 (1=)y
i
;
x
i
0

2;1
= e
i
0
2;1
 p
1
e
i
1;1
+
i
1
+(1=)y
i
; y
i
 (p
1
e
i
1;1
+e
i
2;1
 
i
1
); and y
i
  (e
i
0
2;1
 p
1
e
i
1;1
+
i
1
): At
s = 2 or s = 3; x
i
2;s
= p
s
e
i
1;s
+e
i
2;s
 
i
s
+y
i
; x
i
0

2;s
= e
i
0
2;s
 p
s
e
i
1;s
+
i
s
 y
i
; y
i
  p
s
e
i
1;s
 e
i
2;s
+
i
s
;
4
A possible choice of parameters is for instance

1
= 1; 
2
= 
3
=
1
2
;

1
1
= 
1
1
= 1; 
1
2
= 
1
2
=
4
3
; 
1
3
= 
1
3
=
2
3
;

2
1
= 
2
1
= 1; 
2
2
= 
2
2
=
2
3
; 
2
3
= 
2
3
=
4
3
;
e
1
1
= (1; 1)
0
; e
1
2
= (1; 1)
0
; e
1
3
= (2; 1)
0
;
e
2
1
= (1; 1)
0
; e
2
2
= (2; 1)
0
; e
2
3
= (1; 1)
0
:
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and y
i
 e
i
0
2;s
  p
s
e
i
1;s
+ 
i
s
: The remaining parameters of the rationing scheme are set so
as not to be binding.
(iii) If (
i
s
+ 
i
0
s
)=(e
i
1;s
+ e
i
0
1;s
)  p
s
 
i
0
s
=e
i
0
1;s
; there is aggregate excess supply of com-
modity 1, and individual i supplies the commodity, rationed by the demand of individual
i
0
: Equilibria obtain for z

1;s
= e
i
0
1;s
  
i
0
s
=p
s
; x
i
1;s
= e
i
1;s
+ e
i
0
1;s
  
i
0
s
=p
s
; x
i
0

1;s
= 
i
0
s
=p
s
; and
y
i
0

=  y
i
: At s = 1; x
i
2;1
= e
i
2;1
 p
1
e
i
0
1;1
+
i
0
1
  (1=)y
i
; x
i
0

2;1
= p
1
e
i
0
1;1
+e
i
0
2;1
 
i
0
1
+(1=)y
i
;
y
i
 (e
i
2;1
  p
1
e
i
0
1;1
+ 
i
0
1
); and y
i
  (p
1
e
i
0
1;1
+ e
i
0
2;1
  
i
0
1
): At s = 2 or s = 3;
x
i
2;s
= e
i
2;s
  p
s
e
i
0
1;s
+ 
i
0
s
+ y
i
; x
i
0

2;s
= p
s
e
i
0
1;s
+ e
i
0
2;s
  
i
0
s
  y
i
; y
i
  e
i
2;s
+ p
s
e
i
0
1;s
  
i
0
s
;
and y
i
 p
s
e
i
0
1;s
+ e
i
0
2;s
  
i
0
s
: The remaining parameters of the rationing scheme are set so
as not to be binding.
(iv) If 
i
0
s
=e
i
0
1;s
 p
s
; both individuals supply commodity 1, are fully rationed on their
supply of the commodity and no trade takes place. Fix-price equilibria obtain for z

1;s
= 0;
x
i
1;s
= e
i
1;s
; x
i
0

1;s
= e
i
0
1;s
; and y
i
0

=  y
i
: At s = 1; x
i
2;1
= e
i
2;1
 (1=)y
i
; x
i
0

2;1
= e
i
0
2;1
+(1=)y
i
;
y
i
 e
i
2;1
; and y
i
  e
i
0
2;1
: At s = 2 or s = 3; x
i
2;s
= e
i
2;s
+y
i
; x
i
0

2;s
= e
i
0
2;s
 y
i
; y
i
  e
i
2;s
;
and y
i
 e
i
0
2;s
: The remaining parameters of the rationing scheme are set so as not to be
binding.
Competitive equilibrium prices are given by p

s
=

1
s
+
2
s
e
1
1;s
+e
2
1;s
; s = 1; 2; 3; and q

=
1

: Those
prices belong to the intersection of cases (ii) and (iii). The allocations described there
qualify as competitive equilibrium allocations.
The utility attained by each individual at a x-price equilibrium is unambiguously
determined by the prices of commodities. At prices p; the utility of individual i at the
x-price equilibrium is v
i
(p) =
P
s2S

s
v
i
s
(p
s
); where
Case (i) v
i
s
(p
s
) = 
i
s
ln e
i
1;s
+ 
i
s
e
i
2;s
;
v
i
0
s
(p
s
) = 
i
0
s
ln e
i
0
1;s
+ 
i
0
s
e
i
0
2;s
;
Case (ii) v
i
s
(p
s
) = 
i
s
ln(

i
s
p
s
) + 
i
s
(p
s
e
i
1;s
+ e
i
2;s
  
i
s
);
v
i
0
s
(p
s
) = 
i
0
s
ln(e
i
0
1;s
+ e
i
1;s
 

i
s
p
s
) + 
i
0
s
(e
i
0
2;s
  p
s
e
i
1;s
+ 
i
s
);
Case (iii) v
i
s
(p
s
) = 
i
s
ln(e
i
1;s
+ e
i
0
1;s
 

i
0
s
p
s
) + 
i
s
(e
i
2;s
  p
s
e
i
0
1;s
+ 
i
0
s
);
v
i
0
s
(p
s
) = 
i
0
s
ln(

i
0
s
p
s
) + 
i
0
s
(p
s
e
i
0
1;s
+ e
i
0
2;s
  
i
0
s
);
Case (iv) v
i
s
(p
s
) = 
i
s
ln e
i
1;s
+ 
i
s
e
i
2;s
;
v
i
s
(p
s
) = 
i
0
s
ln e
i
0
1;s
+ 
i
0
s
e
i
0
2;s
:
Substitution of the competitive equilibrium prices in either case (ii) or case (iii) gives the
utility levels at the competitive equilibrium. The indirect utility function is dierentiable
at competitive prices which conrms Proposition 4.8. The derivative is given by
@
p
s
v
i
(p

) = 
s

i
s

i
0
s
e
i
1;s
 
i
s
e
i
0
1;s

i
s
+
i
0
s
=  
s

i
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
);
@
p
s
v
i
0
(p

) = 
s

i
0
s

i
s
e
i
0
1;s
 
i
0
s
e
i
1;s

i
0
s
+
i
s
=  
s

i
0
s
(x
i
0

s
  e
i
0
s
):
For v
s
= 
s
(
2
s
e
1
1;s
  
1
s
e
2
1;s
)=(
1
s
+ 
2
s
); it holds that
V =
 
@v
1
(p

)
@v
2
(p

)
!
=
 

1
1
v
1

1
2
v
2

1
3
v
3
 
2
1
v
1
 
2
2
v
2
 
2
3
v
3
!
:
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If the matrix V has full row rank, then price regulation can Pareto improve the competitive
equilibrium allocation. If the ratios of the marginal utilities of income of the individuals
are not the same across all states of the world, 
1
1
=
2
1
6= 
1
2
=
2
2
or 
1
3
=
2
3
6= 
1
2
=
2
2
; for the
matrix V to have full row rank it is sucient that v
s
6= 0; for every state of the world.
Since v
s
= 0 if and only if e
1
1;s
=e
2
1;s
= 
1
s
=
2
s
; generically in the endowments of individuals
it is possible to Pareto improve on the competitive allocation
5
. This is also the essence of
Proposition 5.3. Only here, because of linear utility in the numeraire commodity, variations
in endowments do not aect the marginal utilities of income at equilibrium and an ad hoc
argument is required.
Since L < I; it is not always possible to Pareto improve on the competitive equilibrium
by a uniform price regulation. A Pareto improvement by a uniform price regulation may
fail if 
1
1
v
1
+
1
2
v
2
+
1
3
v
3
and  
2
1
v
1
 
2
2
v
2
 
2
3
v
3
have opposite signs. This is by no means
excluded.
7 Conclusion
Given any prices for commodities and assets, a competitive allocation of resources ex-
ists, but does in general involve endogenously determined amounts of rationing. Local
comparative statics are complicated at competitive equilibrium prices. Arbitrarily small
deviations from competitive prices may lead to discontinuous jumps in allocations and
utilities. Necessary and sucient conditions for local uniqueness of x-price equilibria in
the neighborhood of competitive equilibria are derived. Provided those conditions hold,
price regulation oers opportunities for eciency gains when asset markets are incomplete.
This conclusion does not change when uniform price regulation is considered only.
A serious concern are the informational requirements needed to determine, even com-
pute, improving interventions. In the case of price regulation they involve knowledge of
marginal utilities of income and excess demands for commodities across states. The char-
acterization in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) and in Kubler and Polemarchakis
(1999) are only rst steps towards an analysis of the informational requirements of active
policy.
5
For the specication of parameters given in footnote 12,
V =

0  
1
3
1
6
0
1
6
 
1
3

:
Both individuals benet if the price of commodity 1 in states 2 and 3 is xed below its competitive
equilibrium value. A Pareto improvement can even be achieved by a uniform price regulation, although
this is not necessarily the case if L < I:
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